Strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, changing the security framework.

© Yonhap News

 On September 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un departed for Russia aboard the "Sun" ship. On September 13, the two leaders met at the Vostochny Cosmodrome. The main content of the meeting was not made public, and the meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin did not include any discussion of the highly publicized trade in conventional weapons, including ammunition. But the "tardy" Putin, who was four hours and 15 minutes late for a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 and two and a half hours late for a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2018, arrived 30 minutes early to greet Kim and introduce him to Russian satellites, and shook hands for 40 seconds to greet each other. 

 

 In fact, the reason for such a close relationship is not just an alliance. It's because Putin's interest in getting his hands on ammunition and artillery shells, which are hard to come by due to sanctions, and Kim's interest in launching a reconnaissance satellite, which has twice failed, are perfectly aligned. The refined oil that Russia began sending back to North Korea in December of last year, after cutting off supplies for a while, can be understood as a kind of "down payment.

 

 There is no way to stop the North Korean-Russian military deal. Despite the U.S. threats, North Korea's clandestine arms trade along the Tumen River border is difficult to stop. What is more serious than the arms deal is that the two countries are moving toward a strategic alliance that goes beyond the "automatic participation" of the past. Putin's decision to escalate the war in Ukraine rather than end it, and Kim Jong-un's accelerated nuclear program that no one in the international community opposes, are ominous signs of a nuclear-linked strategic alliance that marks a turning point in South Korea's security.

 

 The transfer of satellite technology to North Korea, which Putin has now flaunted from his Vostochny space base, is likely to be done in the name of space development cooperation. The problem is that it won't stop there. Kim Jong-un has declared a nuclear-powered submarine as one of his top five defense priorities for 2021. If Russia were to surreptitiously hand over small nuclear reactor technology, a key enabler, to North Korea, it would be a "game changer" for Northeast Asian security. If North Korea's unsophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are mounted on nuclear-powered submarines and secretly launched in the Pacific Ocean, it will be difficult for South Korea, Japan, and the United States to defend against them.

 

 U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan cooperation needs to get busy. The U.S. has agreed to transfer nuclear submarine technology to Australia as part of its Ocus alliance with Britain and Australia. There is no reason why the U.S.-Japan security situation should be any different. It makes sense for the United States to transfer nuclear-powered submarine technology to South Korea and Japan to lower the security threat. North Korea's nuclear submarines are bound to be watched and tracked by South Korea's and Japan's nuclear submarines. At the same time, we need to fix the U.S.-South Korea nuclear agreement, which has several layers of shackles. Although we are reserving our nuclear weapons for the time being, we should have a nuclear potential that is symmetrical to North Korea's nuclear weapons as leverage. The ROK is in the midst of a major transformation that will reshape its security.

 

Sun Minjun (2-4)¹ | Staff Reporter

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